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Williams v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 (Oct. 25, 2018)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND CONTRIVED SEXUAL ALLEGATIONS BY MINORS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that (1) a district court must perform a comprehensive three-step 
analysis when a defendant challenges the use of race in peremptory strikes and that (2) a district 
court should hold a hearing when a defendant seeks to admit evidence showing that a minor 
victim could have contrived sexual abuse allegations. 
 
Background 
 
 Gregory Williams was convicted of six counts of sexual misconduct for sexually assaulting 
a minor under the age of 14 and for lewdness with another minor under the age of 14. During jury 
selection, the State used a peremptory strike to remove Juror No. 23, a black woman. Williams 
made a Batson2 challenge to the removal, arguing that Juror No. 23 was removed due to her race. 
The State argued that it dismissed Juror No. 23 for race-neutral reasons. After the State offered its 
explanation, the district court immediately decided that the State’s reason was race-neutral. On 
appeal, Williams argued that the district court clearly erred in denying his challenge to the State’s 
use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American woman from the venire. 
  Williams also argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence that the young 
girls were able to contrive their allegations because they had been exposed to sexually explicit 
information at home. He stated that the district court should have allowed him to question the girls 
under oath outside the presence of the jury to ascertain their awareness of their mother’s career in 
the adult film industry and their exposure to sexual information at home. This appeal followed.  
 
Discussion 
II. 
 Under Batson v. Kentucky it is unconstitutional to use a peremptory strike to remove a 
potential juror based on race. 3 Such discrimination in jury selection constitutes a structural error 
that requires reversal.4 In analyzing a Batson challenge, district courts should undertake a three-
step inquiry. First, the party opposing the peremptory strike must make a prima facie showing that 
the challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Second, the proponent of the strike must present 
a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Finally, the Court should hear argument on the issue and 
determine whether the opponent of the strike has proven intentional discrimination.  
 
A. 
 In making its prima facie showing, the party opposing the strike must demonstrate “that 
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”5 The party 
opposing the strike can present various forms of evidence including a pattern of discriminatory 
                                                          
1  By Arthur Burns. 
2  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
3  Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.  
4  Diomampo v. State, 124 Nev. 414, 423, 185 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2008). 
5  Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.  
strikes, a disproportionate impact of peremptory strikes, the statements and questions during voir 
dire, and whether the case itself is sensitive to bias.6  
 Here, Williams argued that Juror No. 23 was excluded solely because of her race. Before 
Williams was able to make his prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the State asserted 
that it had a race-neutral reason for excluding Juror No. 23. Because the State provided a race-
neutral reason for its strike before Williams could make his prima facie case, the Court determined 
that step one was moot and that it was appropriate to move onto step two.  
 
B. 
 At step two, the State must provide a race-neutral reason for excluding a potential juror.7 
At this point, the district court need only determine that the State has provided an ostensibly race-
neutral explanation for the peremptory strike; the district court should not at this point make a final 
determination until it has conducted the inquiry required by step three.8 
 Here, the State explained that it struck the potential juror, a physician’s assistant, because 
the juror stated that sometimes “science gets it wrong, even though she’s a doctor.” Additionally, 
the State claimed that Juror No. 23 likely would not “deliberate in the group effectively,” that she 
“was closed off,” and “her answers were short, [and] she was unwilling to communicate much 
more than yes or no answers.” The Court concluded that these race-neutral explanations satisfied 
the State’s burden at step two.  
 
C. 
 In step three, the district court must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful 
discrimination.9 The district court “must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and 
direct evidence of intent as may be available’ and consider all relevant circumstances” before 
dismissing the challenged juror.10 The district court should sustain the Batson challenge when it is 
“more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.”11 
 Here, the district court failed to follow the proper procedures. Upon hearing the State’s 
ostensibly race-neutral explanation for dismissing Juror No. 23, the district court immediately 
made its final determination, stating “I find it was race-neutral. I don’t think it was because of race, 
but I also noticed that you, [defense counsel], kicked an African American lady off first.” After 
the district court made this determination, Williams asked for an opportunity to respond to the 
State’s race-neutral explanation. The Court found that Williams should not have needed to ask the 
district court to perform step three of the Batson analysis. The Court found that the district court 
never conducted the sensitive inquiry required by step three.  
 District courts are usually granted significant deference in exercising their discretion on a 
Batson challenge because the district court is able to assess the demeanor of the prosecutor and the 
prospective juror. But in this case only part of the basis for the peremptory strike involved the 
demeanor of the struck juror, and the district court summarily denied the Batson challenge without 
making a factual finding regarding the juror’s demeanor. The Court thus concluded that there was 
no basis to find that the district court based its denial on the State’s demeanor argument.  
                                                          
6  Watson v. State, 130 Nev. 764, 776, 335 P.3d 157, 167 (2014) 
7  Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  
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 The Court further concluded that the State’s argument that it dismissed Juror No. 23 
because she expressed skepticism about science appeared pretextual. During voir dire, Juror No. 
23 acknowledged that sometimes “science gets it wrong” and that the results of a test using 
technology can be incorrect. Several other jurors also expressed doubts about science and were not 
struck. The Court concluded that the State’s failure to follow up with questions for Juror No. 23, 
or to strike the other jurors who expressed similar skepticism, suggested that the State’s race-
neutral explanation for dismissing Juror No. 23 was pretextual.  
 The Court found that without a factual finding from the district court, the record did not 
support the State’s demeanor argument. In fact, the information in the record regarding the 
demeanor of Juror No. 23 seemed to contradict the State’s assertions. While the State argued that 
Juror No. 23 was “closed off” and only gave short answers, the Court found that she gave longer 
answers when appropriate and displayed a sense of humor. The Court found that the record 
provided no evidence to support the State’s assertion that Juror No. 23 would not deliberate 
effectively in a group.  
 The Court acknowledged the considerable human, economic, and social costs of a reversal 
and retrial. However, given the district court’s mishandling of Williams’s Batson challenge and 
the pretextual nature of at least part of the State’s race-neutral explanation for striking Juror No. 
23, the district court clearly erred in denying Williams’s Batson challenge. Because this was a 
structural error, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 
 
III. 
 
 The Court next turned to the issue of the procedure for admitting or excluding evidence to 
show that the minor victims had the knowledge to contrive sexual abuse allegations. Williams 
wished to present evidence showing that the girls knew enough about sex to have fabricated their 
allegations. Williams specifically wished to admit evidence of the fact that the girls’ mother sold 
adult toys and performed in adult films. Despite the statement of one of the girls that her mother 
was a “porn star” and a statement from the other girl that she had viewed pornography, the State 
argued that there was no evidence the girls knew about their mother’s career.  
 The district court initially scheduled a hearing to determine what the girls knew about their 
mother’s career but cancelled it after defense counsel interviewed the girls at their school without 
their mother’s permission. Williams refiled his motion twelve days before the trial, and the district 
court denied it, stating that the evidence lacked relevance unless the State first opened the door by 
arguing that the girls were sexually innocent and incapable of making up their story. The Court 
found this ruling to be an error.  
 A defendant may show that an alleged victim has experienced incidents of sexual conduct 
and thus has the ability to contrive sexual allegations.12 Williams’s theory of defense was that the 
girls fabricated their allegations against him because they wanted to get him out of their house. 
Williams wanted to rebut the assumption that a ten and twelve-year-old girl were too sexually 
innocent to describe the sexual acts they accused Williams of performing. The district court erred 
by categorically excluding evidence of the girls’ mother’s sexual activities because there is no 
requirement that the State open the door for Williams to present such evidence. 
 The fact that the girls were exposed to pornography makes it more likely that they would 
be able to contrive sexual allegations. Williams sought to introduce evidence to show the girls’ 
knowledge of sexual acts, not to attack their character or their mother’s character. While it is 
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possible that the potential prejudice for such evidence would outweigh its probative value, the 
district court should have weighed the probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice. 
When a defendant moves to admit evidence to show that a young victim has the knowledge to 
contrive sexual allegations, a district court should give the defendant an opportunity to show that 
"due process requires the admission of such evidence because the probative value in the context 
of that particular case outweighs its prejudicial effect on the [victim]."13 
 When offering evidence to show that a young victim had the knowledge to contrive sexual 
allegations, courts should follow the standard from Guitron v. State.14 The defendant must first 
make an offer of proof regarding the evidence he wishes to admit. The district court should then 
hold a hearing in which the defendant presents justification for admitting the evidence. The State 
should then have the opportunity to show the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value 
of the evidence. The State should look at “whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual 
conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an 
improper emotional basis.”15 On remand, the district court should engage in the appropriate 
analysis to determine whether Williams should be allowed to present the evidence that the girls 
had the knowledge to contrive sexual allegations against him.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court determined that the district court erred by denying Williams’s Batson challenge 
and in excluding evidence that the girls had the knowledge to contrive their allegations against 
Williams. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to 
the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.  
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